The Channel dash

The German navy's most audacious move of the Second World War

The Channel dash carried out by the Kriegsmarine’s battleships Scharnhorst and Gniesnau with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen was a brave and some might suggest fool hardy push to bring the surface ships back to the safety of German shipyards for repair and redeployment along the most expeditious route - through the English Channel. It was to be one of the few noteworthy victories of the German Navy in the Second World War

This is an overview of the event and it does deserve a more indepth day by day almost blow by blow account - maybe for the anniversary in February!

Also, because there are bits where different people are attacking at different times and the narrative kind of crosses over itself in places I've written a time line which appears at the bottom of the article. I know I got lost in the writing so hoping this means no one gets lost in the reading!

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The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau

The German Brest Battle group

In January 1941 Admiral Lutjens led Scharnhorst and Gneisenau out into the Atlantic to prey on Allied shipping which had a limited impact with 22 ships sunk or captured and the Royal Navy were unable to stop them.

By the Autumn of 1941 there was an ongoing disagreement in Berlin as to the future of the taskforce at Brest. Raeder was hoping that they could still be used for further operations in the Atlantic though he had told Hitler that the Tirpitz should not be sent as there was a shortage of fuel available to support her in commerce raiding operations. However Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be pivotal to operations and Raeder envisioned the political situation with Spain changing so that bases would be available closer to the Atlantic and France might supply ships for further operations. Raeder also hoped to send them to carry out operations in the Mediterranean or at the very least against British convoys running north to south from the Home islands. He proposed that as soon as the ships were near full repair that they should carry out a couple of training cruises to bring their crews up to scratch after their long spell in dock.

Hitler was not so convinced of this. Following a British raid on the Lofoten islands in March 1941 exposing the weaknesses of northern Norway the Fuhrer had become obsessed with the idea that the British would mount an attack and put pressure on Sweden and Finland affecting Germany’s ore imports. What he felt would be needed is a naval presence to interdict British forces and provide long range artillery. His view of the battleships was that they were somewhat useless and were very vulnerable to

airborne torpedo attack and even going out for training cruises might result in them being attacked and sunk. Further to that Donitz was unhappy that the battleships had needed 800 extra dockyard workers to come and help repair them from their bomb and torpedo damage and they had been taken from his U-boat ports which slowed repairs and routine maintenance of his submarines which were much more effective compared to the battleships.

It was suggested that the two battleships could be routed through the Denmark Strait if the weather went their way and the Prinz Eugen could be routed through the English Channel. Hitler believed that the two battleships could also go through the Channel but Raeder strongly opposed the idea and pleaded with Hitler to wait and see if the political and military situation would change by January 1942. He was hoping for the Spanish bases and even for Japan to enter the War believing that when the Allies found themselves fighting a two Ocean war they would have to split military and merchant shipping.

In the meantime plans were drawn up to work on the feasibility of bringing the force up the Channel by the Navy but Raeder remained heavily opposed believing that it was too dangerous with the danger of mines and that as soon as the ships looked ready to sail and fully repaired the British would be informed by their spies and have a force of warships waiting for them and then of course there was the Straits of Dover.

At the start of January 1942 it was clear that Raeder’s hopes for a change in the political situation was not possible and Hitler expressed the view that the battleships should push up the channel telling Raeder that if her persisted to object he would order the battleships to be decommissioned in Brest and their crews and guns redeployed to Norway. Raeder had to agree to the proposal.

The conditions for such a move had to be just right for the move to maintain secrecy. Firstly the vessels would not be fully repaired before they put to sea so informants would have no idea they were good to go and there would be no training cruises. There would also have to be very close coordination between the Navy and Luftwaffe. On the 12th January at the Wolf’s lair a meeting was held with Vizadmiral Cillax (who would command any push) Oberst Galland of the Luftwaffe to organise the fighter aircraft umbrella, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Hans Jeschonnek, Jodl, Keital, and Commander Ruge (who commanded the Minesweepers in the region) with Hitler and Raeder overseeing it with Hitler being very impressed and enthused by the thoroughness of the plan.

Hitler again pressed the Navy to go for a Channel dash and Cillax agreed that the Channel was the best route rather than going around the British isles with its guarded channels and the proximity to the main British fleet at Scapa Flow. His main stipulation to leading an operation through the channel was that they needed adequate fighter cover but Jeschonnek could only promise 230 aircraft which wouldn’t be a necessarily good enough number. On top of that though Hitler agreed with Cillax that leaving at night time would give the battleships a head start over the RAF and the audaciousness of pushing through the Straits of Dover in daylight appealed to Hitler who didn’t believe the British would expect it.